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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks a solution to the problem of assuring the privacy 
of low value client information such as that maintained by a 
hospital.  The proposed solution involves the development of a 
compliant low-cost system.  It is based on the fundamental 
requirement that such a system needs to provide integration, 
generalization and inbuilt consent.  Integration brings together the 
technical, managerial and regulatory components of an 
organisation’s system.  Generalization provides all the access 
control functionalities that are necessary for the system to be 
useful in a diverse range of organisations.  Inbuilt consent ensures 
that data owners consent to the use of their personally identified 
data.  The Integrated System proposed here uses a Client-Task 
approach.  It is based on the observation that a client is not a user 
of the system yet has a form of ownership over their personally 
identified data held within the system.  Furthermore, in industries 
such as health, it is often the professionals and managers who 
determine who has access rather than systems administrators. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection – access 
controls. 
H.4.1 [Information Systems Applications]: Office Automation – 
workflow management. 
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues – privacy. 
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Security and Protection – authentication, unauthorized access. 
General Terms 
Management, Security, Theory. 
Keywords 
Authorization, Tasks, Groups, Context, Roles. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The increase in personally identified client data managed by 
computer systems has meant the cost of providing data security 
has become a significant issue to organisations.  One of the 
purposes of this paper is to outline the problems that must be 
overcome in providing cost effective privacy for client data.  The 
paper deals with the protection of electronic records which is a 
significant issue in contemporary healthcare.  Our approach is to 
take a broad look at the problem with a view to incorporating 
diverse aspects of access control into a general solution.  This is 
in contrast to methods which tailors solutions to specific 
problems. 
In this paper “privacy” should be interpreted as a legal term while 
“security” should be interpreted as an IT concept relating to 
access control.  This means that in terms of enabling the desired 
privacy goals within computer systems, system security should be 
viewed as the means to privacy protection.  The paper also seeks a 
flexible solution where a range of regulations or legal rulings can 
be modelled in the system rather than adopting just one particular 
approach.  This enables the system to cope with regulatory 
changes.   
There are two aspects of security to consider.  The first is to 
restrict access to the system to legitimate users.  This problem is 
handled by employing appropriate authentication techniques.  The 
second is to further restrict access to legitimate users on a need-to-
know basis.  This problem is handled by authorization techniques.  
Our research deals with the second problem of authorization.  Our 
primary motivation is to provide fine-grained access to health 
records based on a worker’s role and their membership of a 
treating team. 
When we look at the cost of implementing system security, 
Lampson [27] states that: 
“Practical security balances the cost of protection and 
the risk of loss, which is the cost of recovering from a 
loss times its probability…..When the risk is less than 
the cost of recovering, it’s better to accept it as a cost 
of doing business….. than to pay for better security.” 
This means in practical terms that the lower the value of the 
information that is to be protected, the lower the cost of 
administration must be.  Legislative requirements that many 
countries have adopted, based on the OECD data security 
principles [32], have provided an impetus for organisations to try 
to improve their security protection.  However, in many practical 
cases where the security requirements are complex (fine-grained), 
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the cost of administration can only be reduced to suitable levels 
by compromising security.  Consider a situation where all 
clinicians in a hospital have access to the complete medical 
records of all of the patients in the hospital, regardless of their 
roles and whether or not they are treating them. 
The basic problem then is, “How can the privacy of low value 
information be assured?”  This problem is particularly relevant to 
the Health domain that we are concerned with, where personally 
identified patient data is generally of low financial value.  This is 
not to say that such information is not important, but that in the 
vast majority of cases no-one would be prepared to pay much for 
the information.  From the view of medical practitioners and 
managers the problem can be seen as, “How can protection of 
digital data be provided for reasonable cost?” 
There are two fundamental techniques which can be applied to 
solve the “low-value protection problem”.  The first technique is 
to increase the “apparent value” of the information by instituting 
monetary penalties for privacy breaches and/or non-compliant 
systems.  This paper deals with the second technique, the 
development of a compliant low-cost system.  The system 
proposed employs a “Client-Task” approach to access control.  It 
seeks to address the two fundamental issues of compliance and 
cost. 
1.1 Compliance 
The compliancy aim and basic methodology used here are similar 
to that of “the formal task-based privacy-model” proposed by 
Fischer-Hübner and Ott [22].  However, our approach focuses 
more on consent.  It essentially revolves around the concept that: 
Privacy compliance fundamentally requires data owners to 
consent to the use of their personally identified data. 
This concept effectively describes what access control is all about.  
“Compliance” implies that there must be an appropriate legislative 
& policy framework in place.  In order to define if an access is 
compliant, data ownership within a system must be accurately 
specified.  In this context data ownership refers to the name 
specified as the owner of the data/file within the system rather 
than to any legal type of ownership, though the two may be 
related.  Our view is that the individual described in the data, the 
client, should be given some form of ownership of their data 
within the system.  Finally, the concept states that consent from 
the owner is required for all accesses to personally identified data.  
This means that consent must be seen as part of the system.  This 
leads our first requirement: 
Requirement 1: Compliance requires inbuilt consent. 
Data ownership is a complex issue and is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  We assume client ownership of data here as this type of 
ownership is not dealt with, to our knowledge, in current models.  
1.2 Low-Cost 
There are two types of system costs – “setup cost” and running 
costs (“overheads”).  This leads to another requirement: 
Requirement 2: Low-cost requires low setup cost and low 
overheads. 
The setup cost of a software system depends on its complexity and 
on its reusability.  A low cost system must be as simple as 
practicable and usable in many different environments.  A simple 
access control solution which can be applied generally to 
organizations is needed.  This gives us our next requirement: 
Requirement 3: Low setup requires generalisation. 
In order to have low overheads in a complex system manual tasks 
must be efficiently automated.  The process of automation can 
only work efficiently if all parts of the system are able to interact 
effectively with other parts of the system.  For example, service-
related operations need to trigger related operations such as the 
attainment of consent.  This leads to the requirement: 
Requirement 4: Low overheads require integration. 
1.3 A Compliant Low-Cost System 
Reiterating, the goal of this work is the development of a 
compliant low-cost system.  The previous requirements lead to the 
principle requirement: 
Requirement 5: Low-cost compliance requires an integrated 
general system with inbuilt consent. 
This is a conceptual paper.  We are deliberately looking at the 
whole problem with a broad view using a “top-down” approach.  
Our solution essentially revolves around client (patient) consent 
being given in terms of the approval of a worker’s membership of 
a client service team (treating team).  Further access restrictions 
are then based on the worker’s role or other group memberships.  
The cost problem is addressed through enabling managerial and 
professional control of group memberships, much of which can be 
automated through triggering by workflow tasks. 
In the next three sections we look at the three components of 
Requirement 5 – integration, generalization and inbuilt consent.  
These are the essential requirements needed to achieve 
compliance at low-cost. 
2. INTEGRATION 
Any type of integration of parts requires that commonalities 
between the parts are found and used as the basis for integration.  
It is necessary to examine each part in order to tease out the 
commonalities.  Since we are working conceptually we want to 
consider the nature of the parts in our systems rather than specific 
details of how they work.  We therefore subdivide the parts of the 
system on the basis of their fundamental purpose.  We introduce 
three “views of access control” to describe purpose.  The three 
views are described in the following sub-section.  Once they have 
been described we will discuss how they can be integrated. 
2.1 Views of Access Control 
2.1.1 Technical View 
The technical view relates to how systems administrators deal 
with access control.  The vast majority of current access control 
systems use the Subject-Object approach where users (subjects) 
are granted privileges (rights) to access information (objects). 
System Administrators are charged with the task of managing the 
organisation’s system.  They have an inherent responsibility to 
provide protection for the information contained within the 
system.  The continual information demands of users often weight 
against this need for protection.  Often the balance between 
protection and availability are tipped in one direction.  Imbalance 
produces systems where it is difficult for users to gain access to 
the information they need or systems where protection of 
information is limited. 
Most systems put the onus on setting up access rules in advance.  
There is often little or no scope for dealing with unpredictable 
access requirements. 
Figure 1 shows the components of a simple access control system.  
Administrators are responsible for storing and managing the files 
(objects), System Administrators are responsible for granting 
privileges to users and for managing system auditing, and Staff 
Managers are responsible for allocating jobs to users and dealing 
with audit results.  It may be that in particular organisations the 
System Administrator(s) perform two of the three or even all of 
these roles. 
 Figure 1: Technical View 
2.1.2 Management View 
Managers are the people in the organization who are essentially 
responsible for maintaining productivity and making spending 
decisions.  There is naturally a tendency for them to concentrate 
on service-related tasks.  They are interested in job allocation & 
completion.  System security can be seen as imposing unnecessary 
work and cost.   
Figure 2 shows the components of a simple management system.  
It illustrates how the roles of staff managers are described in the 
Organisation Management Structure and that they are primarily 
responsible for the allocation of clients and tasks to workers.  The 
diagram also shows the links between the management system and 
the Access Control and Consent Management Systems. 
 Figure 2: Management View 
2.1.3 Regulatory View 
Governments and professional associations are increasingly 
introducing regulations that impose conditions on how workers 
may access personalized data.  The basic view is that private 
information must be protected. 
Regulations are put into place to enforce the Principle of Least 
Privilege which requires that accesses be allowed on a need-to-
know basis.  They may specify the conditions where consent must 
be obtained and outline what constitutes consent.  They seek to 
ensure that data owners are informed of who can see their data 
and what they can do to restrict access to sensitive info.  
Regulations limiting the secondary use of data are also common. 
 Figure 3: Regulatory View 
Figure 3 gives an outline of the regulatory view.  The three dashed 
rectangles at the top show three levels of rules that impinge upon 
system design and use.  The three dashed boxes at the bottom 
show the associated penalty regimes which apply when the rules 
are breached.  The boxes on the right show system components 
which enforce the required rules and report any rule breaches. 
2.2 An Integrated System 
2.2.1 Joint View 
 
Figure 4: Joint View 
The Joint View shown in Figure 4 is a compilation of the 
Technical View of Figure 1, the Management View of Figure 2, 
and the Regulatory View of Figure 3.  It shows the boundaries 
and links between the three views. 
In most organizations the components of the system vary between 
being paper-based and computer-based.  There are also a variety 
of paper-based and computer-based systems.  In general terms the 
Technical components are “rights-based”, the Management 
components are “task-based”, and the Regulatory components are 
“rule-based”.  The fundamental problem to solve is how to 
incorporate all these differing components in a way that they can 
interrelate.  The key is to find “unifying abstractions” which are 
relevant to all three sections of the Joint View. 
2.2.2 The Common Vocabulary 
The “common vocabulary” introduced here seeks to use terms that 
are meaningful to regulators, managers, system administrators, 
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workers and clients.  It seeks to describe the abstractions that 
unify the technical (access control), managerial (workflow) and 
regulatory (compliance) aspects of the system, allowing diverse 
system components to work together. 
2.2.3 The Client-Task Approach 
Figure 5 describes the Client-Task approach. The following 
statement defines the approach, with the words in italics forming 
the basis of the common vocabulary: 
Managers (supervisors/administrators) employed by the 
organization authorize workers (employees/contractors/ 
users) to perform (service-related) tasks for the organisation’s 
clients subject to the organisation’s policy which complies 
with appropriate regulation. 
Workers and Managers can be placed in groups.  Workers and 
managers perform in their roles (positions) within the 
organization.  Roles can be represented as a type of group.  Each 
group is authorized to perform a set of duties (tasks).  Specific 
duties (client-tasks) are assigned to individual workers. 
The concept of using tasks for access control is not new (see [22, 
41]), but the concept of incorporating clients who are data owners 
who have no direct access to the system may be.  In the workplace 
a task can be thought of as a particular “duty”.  It often has a 
manual component and an IT component.  For example, if a nurse 
has the duty of giving a patient an injection, the nurse is the 
Worker, the patient is the Client and the giving of the injection is 
the Task.  The manual component of the task is the physical 
administration of the injection while the IT component may be 
some sort of record of the task.  In terms of the computer system 
we are only interested in the IT component of the task.  The task 
in Figure 5, Task A, therefore refers to the IT component of the 
task. 
Figure 5: The Client-Task Approach 
Task A is essentially a process which utilises Code A to 
manipulate Data A.  The task is analogous to a “well-formed 
transaction” as defined in the Clarke-Wilson model [10], because 
the worker employs a task to manipulate the data and only has 
access to the data through the task. 
The traditional Subject-Object view of access control says that “a 
subject can be assigned a right to access an object.”  The “Client-
Task” view of access control says that “a worker can be assigned a 
task to perform for a client.”  Task A can be thought of as having a 
right to access Data A.  In Subject-Object terms the Worker is the 
Subject, Task A is/has the access right and Data A is the Object.  
The Client is the owner of Data A and is outside the Organisation 
(represented by the dashed red square in Figure 5). 
2.2.4 The Integrated View 
Now that we have defined the methodology of an integrated 
system, we can describe the components of such a system.  The 
Integrated View of Figure 6 shows how the Joint View of Figure 
4 can be adjusted so as to facilitate the integration of all the 
required system components.  The principal change is the 
combining of the Workflow Management and Access Control 
components into a Central Control System. 
In another change, the User/Worker Management System is 
relocated to a place where it is more a management component 
rather than a technical component.  This reflects the view that 
Organisational Managers should control “Worker Management 
(placing workers in groups)” whereas System Administrators 
should control “Rights Management (assigning tasks to groups)”.  
The Task Creation & Allocation component is so-named to reflect 
the idea that the system is based on the Client-Task approach.  A 
new connection between the Auditing and Reporting components 
is made because there is no need to duplicate reporting facilities 
in the Auditing component. 
 Figure 6: Integrated View 
3. GENERALISATION 
Our research into current access control models has revealed that 
in order to achieve fine grained access control in all situations, 
there are fundamental criteria that must be met.  The general 
solution that we propose is based on the criteria derived from 
existing models.  The problem appears to us to be that none of the 
existing models have sought to incorporate all these criteria.  This 
is the fundamental reason why they cannot efficiently control 
access to personally identified data based on service team 
membership and worker role in all required circumstances. 
An efficient solution requires generalisation to facilitate the 
automation required to cut costs to acceptable levels.  Rather than 
tailoring a solution to meet the needs of a particular hospital, it 
would be more cost effective to have a solution which meets the 
needs of many hospitals.  It would be more cost effective again to 
have a solution which meets the needs of a diverse range of 
organisations.  Generalisation seeks to find such a broadly 
applicable solution. 
This section outlines the criteria for a general purpose access 
control solution which satisfies our treating team scenario.  Each 
sub-section details a required criterion and shows the current 
models which address that criterion.  
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 Figure 7: Context and Constraints 
3.1 Multiple Access Control Contexts 
Figure 7 shows that authorizations are given subject to the 
context.  Contexts essentially represent some attribute that the 
worker has.  Contexts are independent in nature in that one 
context does not affect another.  For example, the Worker’s role 
does not affect their location, though both may be relevant to 
determine if an authorization is to be given.  It is our view that all 
contexts can be represented by group memberships.  This will be 
investigated in ongoing work. 
Many RBAC based models have used context constraints to 
model complex access control needs.  Examples are [23], [4], [5], 
and [31].  The basic idea is that as well as using role-based 
controls, certain context constraints are checked at runtime to 
determine whether accesses should be permitted. 
In order for fine-grained control to be achieved in an access 
control system it needs to be possible for the system to take more 
than one context into account.  For example, an access request 
may need to take the worker’s role and their location into account 
before granting access.  It must be possible to form complex rules.  
The problem is that complex rules normally incur inordinate 
administrative overheads.  Simple administrative techniques 
which have a degree of automation are required to ensure that 
overheads are acceptable. 
A further issue here is how to store the rules and how to process 
access requests.  This is complicated when inter-domain access is 
also required.  The question is which domain’s rules are used and 
how do rules take other domains into account. 
Attribute Based Access Control [42] looks at the inter-domain 
problem.  Rule-Based RBAC approaches [26] [1] [16] are also of 
interest, as is Organisation Based Access Control (ORBAC) [17]. 
3.2 Interdependence of Tasks 
While tasks are analogous to well-formed transactions, they have 
an important additional property – they can be dependent upon 
one-another.  This is a vital property which can be used to model 
access control constraints such as the Separation of Duties.   
Figure 7 shows the dependencies between different tasks. 
Examples of the types of task dependencies are: 
• Mutual exclusion between tasks; 
• Prerequisite tasks; 
• Tasks triggering other tasks; 
• Tasks having Sub-tasks; 
• Limits to the number of tasks performed; and 
• Task allocation methods. 
Work in the areas of Workflow Management Systems (WMSs) 
[37] [6] [7] [3] [25] and Access Control Constraints [4] [5] [31] 
[9] have relevance to this discussion. 
3.3 Inter-Domain Access 
Inter-domain access allows for information to be accessed from 
outside a domain.  Networks in many organisations are now 
accessed from outside the organisation. 
It is common for many copies of information to exist in diverse 
places.  When the original information is updated at the source the 
copies do not reflect these changes.  A system which allows inter-
domain access can mean that the copies can be automatically 
updated.  Alternatively, the source can be accessed when the 
information is needed meaning that copying is not needed. 
There can also be a need to perform tasks remotely.  For example, 
it is common for doctors to authorize procedures remotely. 
The concept of Web Services also requires inter-domain access.  
Services in one domain are provided for users in other domains. 
In order to facilitate inter-domain access it is necessary that 
credentials in one domain are recognised in another domain.  
Role-Based Trust Management [28] [29] is an example where this 
occurs.  Essentially roles in one domain can facilitate access in 
another domain where those roles are recognised.  Other methods 
are described in Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [42] and 
Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC) [12]. 
3.4 Authorization Ordering 
A task may be authorized by a number of different people.  The 
concept of “authorization order” recognizes that the 
authorizations given by one authorizer can override the 
authorizations of another authorizer.  It also recognizes that there 
is logical order of who to seek an authorization from.  Rules can 
dictate the priority for choosing between multiple authorisers.  
Various methods of seeking an authorization can also exist.  
“Discretionary Overriding of Access Control” [36] [35] is an 
example of work in this area. 
3.5 Variable Authorization Timing 
Authorization timing has to do with when an authorization is 
given.  While it is normal to give authorizations before access is 
required, authorizations can also be given at the time access is 
required or even after access is granted.   
Optimistic Security [33] introduced the idea that all accesses can 
initially be allowed.  It allows for integrity to be maintained by 
providing mechanisms for rolling back data to previous states.  
Actions can be taken against users who abuse their access rights. 
Stevens and Wulf [39] categorised authorizations as ex ante when 
given prior to access, uno tempore when given at the time access 
is required, and ex post when given retrospectively. 
3.6 Cooperative Workplace Practices 
Many access control techniques work well in theory but because 
of their rigidity they prove difficult to administer in practice.  This 
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can be partly due to the fact that they do not take cooperative 
workplace practices into account.  A simple example would be a 
nurse taking over another nurse’s work while he/she is on a break. 
To be effective a system must effectively model real world 
practices.  For example, it must be able to: 
• Deal with emergencies; 
• Deal with unpredictable scenarios; 
• Facilitate colleagues helping one another with tasks; and 
• Facilitate the delegation of duties. 
Many of these problems were dealt with in our previous work on 
Professional Access Control (PAC) [15]. 
3.7 A General Solution 
To summarize, the six functions/criteria that a general solution 
must handle are: 
1. Multiple Access Control Contexts; 
2. Interdependence of Tasks; 
3. Inter-domain Access; 
4. Authorization Ordering; 
5. Variable Authorization Timing; and 
6. Cooperative Workplace Practices. 
Current solutions possess some of these criteria but not all.  A 
cost-effective solution should be general in nature and handle all 
six criteria. 
4. INBUILT CONSENT 
Privacy compliance requires access control solutions which 
provide appropriate consent mechanisms.  These consent 
mechanisms must provide functionality that deals with all types of 
consent. 
There are two basic types of consent [11, 13, 24].  They are 
express consent and implied consent.  Express consent requires 
that an explicit indication of consent (eg. in writing, electronically 
or verbally) be given.  Implied consent is consent that can be 
assumed by the circumstances or a person’s actions. 
There is more to consent than just the acquisition of the consent.  
For consent to be legitimate it must be given voluntarily and not 
under any coercion.  The client must be properly informed of the 
implications of their consent being given.  The client must also 
have the capacity to give consent.  That is, there mental and 
physical state must be sufficient for them to be able to give 
legitimate consent. 
4.1 Adding a Consent Mechanism 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [20] [34] [38] extends the 
basic Subject-Object model by allowing subjects to be given 
“roles” which are collections of rights to objects.  RBAC itself has 
been extended to provide additional functionality.  TeaM based 
Access Control (TMAC) [40] [23] [2], as the name suggests, 
allows users to be grouped into teams and privileges to be given 
according to team membership.  Enterprise RBAC (ERBAC) [21] 
[19] and other models [8] [14] [18] seek to make role 
management in large enterprises easier.  Rule based RBAC 
extensions [26] [1] also seek to address complexity problems. 
Figure 8 shows this bottom-up approach.  The model extensions 
basically add administrative mechanisms.  Consent functionality 
could be added on top of this by utilizing another layer of 
administration. 
Figure 8: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Views 
The top-down approach seeks to reduce complexity rather than 
just adding an extra level of new complexity.  To achieve this 
there is a need to incorporate consent as an integral part of 
service-related operations.  To be acceptable, this must be done in 
a way that gives productivity and cost benefits. 
Figure 8 shows the top-down approach.  It uses redefined 
abstractions based on the common vocabulary to enable consent 
to be built into the system.  The consent mechanism is located in 
the Consent Management System component of the Integrated 
System.   
4.2 The Client-Task Consent Mechanism 
The consent concept requires that all tasks that are performed for 
the Client are authorized by the Client.  In this sense consent is 
simply an authorization given by the client to the system.  Figure 
9 shows the Client-Task consent mechanism. 
Figure 9: Client-Task Consent Mechanism 
The Client-Task system implements implied consent by assuming 
that the Client, in agreeing to be serviced by the Organisation, 
accepts the Policy.  Implied consent is then carried out through 
the actions of the Manager.  This can be viewed as an “opt-out” 
approach, but the existing consent mechanisms can easily be 
utilized to facilitate an “opt-in” approach. 
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There are two ways that express consent can be given to the 
system.  Firstly, the client can interact with the system to put their 
authorization directly into the system.  This is termed direct 
consent.  Secondly, the client can give written, verbal or 
electronic consent to either the Manager or the Worker who then 
must enter the authorization into the system.  This is termed 
indirect consent. 
The Consent Mechanism is the part of the system that requires and 
collects the consent authorizations.  Consent authorizations can 
each be implemented through a task which is associated with the 
primary task.  The consent task can incorporate functionality to 
prompt the worker about what he must do, as well as to inform the 
client about the implications of their consent. 
5. KEY CONCEPTS 
This section discusses the key concepts raised in this paper.  
These concepts can be attributed to taking a top-down approach to 
the problem.  The top-down approach allows us to consider the 
access control abstractions in terms of compliancy and workplace 
requirements rather than the traditional way of treating the 
abstractions as technical “building blocks”. 
5.1 System Compliance 
By building a consent mechanism into the system, proof of 
regulatory compliance may be provided.  Proof lies in the fact that 
when the consent mechanism is built into the system so that it is 
automatically triggered, consent based tasks can be tracked and 
audited.  The system can prompt workers and require them to 
follow compliant procedures.  This can limit the number of 
mistakes and oversights that occur.  The ultimate result is that an 
ability to demonstrate compliance to privacy legislation may 
ensure that litigation is avoided.  Compliant systems may thus 
lead to substantial reductions in insurance costs, which is a major 
issue in the health sector. 
5.2 The Concept of Clients 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) models [30] allow users to 
directly specify how other users may access the objects that they 
own.  In organisations where the clients are not users of the 
system, yet have a level of ownership over their records, there is 
no direct mechanism for clients to specify the access requirements 
to the objects they own.  Rather, clients are at the mercy of the 
organisation to correctly control access to their records. 
The fundamental reason why our approach differs from previous 
approaches is that it inherently recognises that the Owner of the 
data is not usually a user of the system.  The dashed red square in 
Figure 5 represents the boundary of the Organisation.  The 
Client/Owner is outside the Organisation while the Worker and 
the data are inside.  This models a standard relationship between 
organisations, workers and clients.  The top-down approach led to 
this differentiation between workers and clients. 
5.3 Dependency Between Rights 
There is perhaps some confusion in security community about 
what constitute static access control and dynamic access control.  
It is sometimes stated that static access control refers to rights that 
are specified in advance and tend not to change and dynamic 
access control is applicable when the context of an access is 
checked at the time of the access. 
We believe that it is more useful to think in terms or whether an 
access right or a task is “dependent” or “independent”.  The real 
reason why Subject-Object based systems are seen as static is that 
they do not express any dependency between access rights.  While 
the use of sessions and mutually exclusive roles [38] does build a 
level of dependency into systems, it is questionable whether these 
dependencies should be at the level of roles.  Rather, we believe 
that roles must be independent and that it is tasks/duties that 
should be dependent.  For example, when a restricted medication 
is prescribed in a hospital which requires the signatures of two 
nurses before being administered, the two nurses do not change 
their roles. Rather there are two tasks, one of signing and the other 
of countersigning, either of which can be performed by a nurse.  It 
is vital not to confuse tasks and roles or to model tasks as roles. 
5.4 The Use of Roles 
It is our view that roles should be viewed as just one type of 
context grouping.  Obviously they are the most important and 
useful type of worker grouping, but they are not different in nature 
from other worker groupings.  While most systems will need to 
employ accesses controls which take roles into account, they do 
not have to.  For example, access could be controlled purely 
according to the worker’s location or their network address. 
In the Client-Task approach the term role refers to an 
organisational position.  A role is what a person is.  A duty or task 
is what they do (in the given role).  The Client-Task approach also 
sees the question of who is given a role (or put into any group) as 
a management decision.  The questions of what rights are given to 
a task and what tasks are assigned to a role (or group) are seen as 
decisions for system administrators. 
6. Conclusions and Further Work 
The protection of low-value client information has proven 
difficult in the health industry.  This is because solutions must be 
low-cost while at the same time being compliant with complex 
regulations.  It was argued that for low-cost compliance to be 
achieved an integrated general system with inbuilt consent is the 
principal requirement.  The Integrated System based on the 
Client-Task approach that we propose in this paper meets this 
requirement. 
The inbuilt consent mechanism used in the Integrated System 
utilizes consent tasks which are triggered by service-related tasks.  
This enables security to be incorporated with positive benefits 
rather than just the imposition of extra work.  Integration and 
generalisation thus provide productivity and usability benefits 
which allow increased automation and feedback to workers.  In 
addition, compliance may lead to substantially reduced insurance 
costs. 
While it is technically possible to add consent mechanisms to 
existing Subject-Object based system such as RBAC, it is our 
contention that such bottom-up approaches can never be 
practically feasible.  This is because such added mechanisms 
generate significant and costly overheads and cannot guarantee 
privacy compliance because privacy regulations and policies are 
not expressed in terms of subjects, rights and objects. 
The Integrated System we propose integrates the technical, 
management and regulatory components of the system by using 
the Client-Task approach.  This approach introduces the concept 
of the Client to access control.  The concept assumes the Client 
has some form of ownership over their personally identified data 
and gives them the required control over it even though they are 
not users of the system.  The Client-Task approach also sees the 
question of who is put into a group as a personnel management 
decision, while the question of which rights are given to a group 
as a decision for system administrators. 
It was found that for the system to be general in nature it must: 
• Handle rules with multiple contexts; 
• Represent constraints through task dependencies; 
• Enable inter-domain access; 
• Handle authorizations in an ordered fashion; 
• Allow authorizations before, at the time of and after 
access is made; and 
• Facilitate cooperative work practices. 
Further work involves the development and testing of a 
comprehensive Integrated System in various organizational 
settings.  The primary scenario will be a hospital as this has a high 
level of complexity.  Different ownership and joint ownership 
variations will also be considered.  Data storage options are 
another related area which may be investigated. 
Regulations are developed outside an organisation.  In current 
systems policy must be manually changed to reflect regulation.  It 
may be feasible however, to have a system where any changes to 
regulations can dynamically change policy.  This would be similar 
to current techniques which are used to automatically update 
software and virus definitions. 
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